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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
The general rule as recognized in England and in the United States
(Louisiana and California by statute incorporated in a modified way
the Roman law with respect to presumptions of survivorship) , is that
where two or more persons perish in the same disaster and there is no
fact or circumstance to prove which survived, the question of such
survivorship is considered incapable of being correctly answered
and in such situation, the difficulty is determined as though the death
of all occurred simultaneously 7 Briefly, the party asserting survivor-
ship, being the party averring the fact, must prove it.
Where, however, there is evidence from which inferences, fair and
reasonable, may be drawn, there is no objection to a consideration of
all the facts, circumstances, and such external indicia as may illumine
the theories and probabilities sought to be advanced. Just precisely
that method was followed in Will of Abram Ehle,8 the court examining
all the minute factors in arriving at a proper solution of a vexing situ-
ation, founded upon the determination of the survivorship of persons
burned in a fire which occurred during the night.
In short, then, generally there is no presumption of survivorship,
the civil law with the doctrine of the survival of the fittest excepted,
but this rigorous restriction yields to the propriety of introducing evi-
dence tending to strengthen or clarify what was perhaps originally
alleged. As a further relaxation of the general doctrine, is the holding
of the court in the Vill of Fowles,9 that the testator may express his
wish as to the presumptions of survivorship and that such expression
of the testator will be recognized, in the absence of any evidence over-
coming it.
J. H. CASEY
Railroads: Commission not authorized to deny certificate of neces-
sity and convenience because of detriment to individuals by inter-
ference with zoning and county planning.-Several years ago, the
Milwaukee Electric Railway and Light Co., completed their new Lake-
side power plant, located several miles south of Milwaukee and destined
to supply electric light and power to Milwaukee and its suburbs. In
order to insure a steady supply of fuel to the new plant, the company
thought it necessary to build another incoming railroad line, running
from the plant to the main line of the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul
Railroad. The proposed trackage was to be about three and a third
miles long, running in an east and west direction. The location as
proposed would take the line through the heart of Tippecanoe, an un-
incorporated village lying about a mile south of Milwaukee, with a
population estimated variously at from a thousand to thirty-five hun-
dred people. The Electric company also proposed to build at the same
time a line about seven miles long, to run in a north and south direction.
This line was intended to skirt the towns of Cudahy and South Mil-
waukee, and the settled spots between, and thus materially lessen the
* 8 Ruling Case Law ii. Par. 13.
'Jones, Evidence 3rd Ed. Par. 64.
"73 Wis. 445., 4i N. W. 627.
9 Supra.
NOTES AND COMMENT
running time between Milwaukee and Racine. About three quarters of
a mile of the proposed east-west line was also to serve for the proposed
north-south line, but the obvious purpose of the east-west line was to
insure a steady, continuous flow of coal to the Lakeside plant.
Under these conditions the Electric company made an application to
the Railroad Commission of Wisconsin for a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity, pursuant to Section 191.o of the statutes, which
provides, in substance, that no railroad shall begin any proposed con-
struction unless it shall have first obtained from the Railroad Commis-
sion a certificate that public convenience and a necessity require the
construction of the railroad as proposed.1
The application was vigorously opposed by the residents of Tippe-
canoe, the Milwaukee Harbor Commission and Milwaukee County.2
This opposition developed on the grounds that the proposed line would
pass through a residential district when, as a matter of fact, an indus-
trial district lay not more than a mile south; that the line, as proposed,
would be injurious to the value, not only of the land through which it
passed, but all the surrounding district; that the line would create a
number of grade crossings upon streets over which a heavy traffic con-
stantly passed; that the proposed line would disrupt the plans of the
Milwaukee Harbor Commission then engaged in planning the Greater
Milwaukee harbor.
After a hearing, however, the Railroad Commission granted the cer-
tificate of public convenience and necessity in accordance with the statu-
tory procedure. The decision of the commission was appealed to the
Circuit Court of Dane county. The court there decided that the certifi-
cate was granted with reliance upon a decision, based upon an erroneous
interpretation of the statutes providing for such control by the commis-
sion, vacated the certificate, and sent the matter back to the Railroad
Commission for a rehearing.3 The Railroad Commission, without fur-
ther hearing, again granted the certificate which the Circuit Court of
Dane county again vacated on the grounds of a non-compliance with
the statutory procedure. From this judgment the Electric company
appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, after discussing
and disposing of some procedural questions which will not be considered
here, undertook to discover the legislative intent and construe the mean-
ing of the several portions of the statutes in dispute.
Chapter 191 of the Wisconsin Statutes, part of the general section
on Railroads, is entitled "State Control of Construction." Section
191.oi, already mentioned, provides that before beginning any proposed
construction, the railroad company shall first secure from the Railroad
Commission a certificate that public convenience and a necessity require
the construction of the said railroad as proposed in the articles of asso-
ciation and that the said certificate shall constitute a license for the
proposed c6nstruction. In section 191.11 are given the grounds upon
which such a certificate may be refused by the Railroad Commission
and the procedure incident thereto. It reads as follows: ".... if upon
'Sec. i9i.oi Wis. Stats.
T. M. E. R. & L. Co. v. Milwaukee County, 2o6 N. W. 2o
'T. M. E. R. & L. Co v. Milwaukee County, Supra.
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the conclusion of said hearing of said application, said commissioners
or a majority of them shall find or determine that said proposed rail-
road is not a necessity or is not required by public convenience either
because already existing railroads or other means of transportation
adequately provide for the necessities and requirements of the public,
OR FOR ANY OTHER REASONS, then said Railroad Commission
shall refuse to grant such certificate ..... "
Dependent upon the meaning in the statutes of the term "public con-
venience and a necessity," and the phrase, "for any other reason,"
arose these questions. May and should the Railroad Commission, in
passing upon an application, consider the reasons which a general public
policy might present, such as zoning laws, depreciation of surrounding
property not directly contingent upon the proposed trackage, number
and kind of grade crossings that will be created and imminence to
schools and playgrounds frequented by children? Or, on the other
hand, will the legislative intent be subserved by having the term "public
convenience and a necessity" refer only to the convenience and necessity
of the traveling public, or that public directly interested in the proposed
transportation? Does the phrase "for any other reasons" cover all
the reasons which might logically be presented to the construction of a
railroad along any certain route, or did the legislature intend that those
reasons must relate only to the general proposition of transportation
and the public interest therein?
The Supreme Court in its decision quotes a statement from a New
York case in which the court, speaking of an application for a certificate
of public convenience and necessity, says:
The object was to permit the railroad commissioners to prevent wasteful com-
petition and public disaster by the construcfion of roads through localities which
already were adequately served rather than to require them to determine the pre-
cise line along which roads should run
This statement alone seems to support the contention that the dis-
cretion of the Railroad Commission, in deciding upon such application
was to be limited to the question merely of transportation. However.
there are several rather essential differences in the statutes of the two
states which tend to becloud rather than clarify the issue.
The Wisconsin section requires that before the issuance of a certifi-
cate there shall be filed with the Railroad Commission maps and profiles
showing the precise route proposed, 6 while the New York sections con-
tain no such provisions.7 The Wisconsin sections also provide that after
the issuance of a certificate by the Railroad Commission the route may
be changed by the railroad company to an extent of not more than one
mile from the route as approved by the Railroad Commission, provided
that such change be not made within the limits of a city or village.8 The
'Sec. 191.1I Wis. Stats.
'People ex rel. N. Y. C. & H. R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 227 N. Y. 248, 125
N. E. 438.
* Sec. i91.o5, Wis. Stats.
'New York Railroad Laws.
'Sec. 191.2o, Wis. Stats.
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New York statutes, however, expressly provide that after the issuance
of a certificate the railroad company may determine the location of the
road, except as to terminals and general direction. 9 These differences
in the statutes would seem to show an intention of greater power in the
Wisconsin commission. Indeed, the provision that there should be no
change from the route approved by the Railroad Commission in cities
and villages seems to imply that matters such as zoning laws, grade
crossings and other factors incident to a comparative density of popu-
lation were to be matters for consideration in the grant of a certificate,
despite the fact that the village in which the proposed trackage is to be
laid has no corporate form of organization.
In addition to the difference in the statutes, we find a New York court
which, speaking of the relief said to be given to property owners along
proposed lines by condemnation proceedings, says: "Property owners
living close to the line of the road, and perhaps, with property so situ-
ated as to cause them greater damage than their neighbors through
whose land the railroad passes, were given no opportunity whatever to
present for judicial determination the question whether the public use
required the building of the railroad."'1 The court here seemingly im-
plies that, since the effects on surrounding property were factors to be
considered in determining public use, public convenience does not refer
alone to transportation.
The Wisconsin decision"l contains a statement from a Federal case
in which the court says "the commission is interested in the public con-
venience and necessity in connection with the construction of the road
in the territory to be served. It is interested in the public; it is not in-
terested in the minutiae of the particular lands to be acquired for the
right of way, nor the rights of the individual owners thereof. '12 Here
is no clarification of public convenience and necessity; indeed, farther
on in the same case the court says "but whether, as in the case at bar,
the line passes through the northerly portion of wild, unoccupied land,
or passes 50o feet farther south on the same forty acres, is a question
with which the commission should not be bothered." Evidently no
principle is here enunciated which would narrow public convenience
and necessity to a question of transportation alone.
The Supreme Court however, in the opinion states, "that the phrase
'for any other reason' relates back to the phrase 'that said railroad is
not a necesity or is not required by public convenience'" and that "the
necessity and convenience contemplated by the statute have reference
to transportation and the public interest therein. Manifestly the incon-
venience of individuals along the proposed right of way could not affect
the general subject of convenience and necessity for transportation
facilities for the general public."
Thus, under this decision, the Railroad Commission, upon a showing
that the convenience and necessity of the public directly interested in
transportation would be served by a proposed line, must grant a certifi-
' Sec. 16, N. Y. Railroad Laws.
"*Peop!e ex rel. Stewart v. Railroad Comm., i6o N.Y. 202, 54 N.E. 697.
,1 T. M. E. R. & L. Co. v. Milwaukee Coanty, Supra.
"Thunder Bay Limestone Co. v. Detroit & M. R. Co. (D. C.) 294 Fed. 958.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
cate of public convenience and necessity, regardless of any reasons
urged against it which do not pertain directly to the traveling public.
GREGORY GRAMLING
Automobiles: "Family doctrine", making owner responsible for
child's negligence, not recognized in Wisconsin.-The so-called
family doctrine as applied in some states does not obtain in Wisconsin,
and the father is not responsible for the negligent operation of his auto-
mobile by his minor child merely because of the relationship existing
between them, but liability must be predicated on the principals of
agency.' A man may be a guest in his own automobile while it is being
driven by his son.2 In this case the son was on an errand of his own.
but had invited his father, the owner of the automobile used, to ride
with him. Held that even though the father was the owner of the car,
he was simply the guest of his son on this particular trip, and since the
son was not about the business of the parent, but on his own private
affairs, the father was in no way liable.
In a most recent case-a minor daughter, nineteen years of age, drove
the family automobile without parental permission and, while on the
way to town to purchase a watermelon for her own use, pleasure and
satisfaction (for she was the only one in the family who indulged)
struck and injured plaintiff. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
the theory that it was the father's duty to furnish necessities of life did
not apply, and as the daughter was engaged in her own affairs, just as
much as if she had driven to town to mail a letter or buy a bag of candy,
the father could not be held liable.'
There are many states-in fact the majority-which are in accord. 4
The rule in all these jurisdiction seems to coincide with that of Massa-
chusetts: "The father is not liable for- the damages resulting from the
negligent operation of the family automobile unless it can be con-
clusively shown that the child was acting as the agent of the parent.
The burden 6f proof is on the plaintiff."'5
H. M. X.
Evidence: Admissions in course of negotiations for compromise
held admissable.-The defendant's daughter, nineteen years of age,
while driving her father's automobile, struck the plaintiff, causing per-
sonal injuries. In an action for the resulting damages a witness was
permitted to testify that he and the plaintiff interviewed the defendant
with reference to a settlement, and during the course of the conversation
the latter stated that at the time of the accident his daughter was in the
'Crossett v. Goelzer, 177 Wis. 455, x88 N. W. 627.
Giffert v. Kayser, 179 Wis. 571, 192 N.W. 26.
'Ruter v. Goohes, 173 Wis. 493.
'Papke v. Haerle, 207 N. W. 261.
flolentine v. Wyatt, 261 S. W. 308.
Ideinoto v. Schedecker, 226 P. 922.
Johnstone v. Stroock, 201 N.Y. Sup. 705.
Curtis v. Harrison, 253 S. W. 470.
Haskell v. Albiani, 139 N. E. 516. (See note 9, Marquette Law Review, 198.)
